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SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. CARMEN HERRERA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
SPERRY CORPORATION, TRAVELERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECOND INJURY 
FUND, AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court No.: 860062 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT G. GARMENT HERRERA 
INTRODUCTION 
In its response to plaintiff Carmen Herrera's appeal, the 
defendant does not challenge many of the central contentions of 
the plaintiff's appeal. The defendant never disputes the plain-
tiff's contention that the definition given the word "accident" in 
the majority of jurisdictions would have covered the plaintiff's 
injury in this case. Nor does the defendant dispute that the 
overly restrictive and artificial definition of accident applied 
by the industrial commission is contra to the main goal of the 
workmen's compensation law, which is to provide workers who are 
injured on the job quick and easy access to benefits. Finally, 
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the defendant does not dispute that this injury was unexpected and 
occurred on the job. 
Instead, the defendant argues that this case is 
controlled by Sabo's Electric Service v. Sabo, 642 P. 2d 722 (Utah 
1982) and that in order for this court to reverse the Industrial 
Commission's decision, it must find that decision to be "wholly 
without cause." The plaintiff responds to these arguments as 
follows. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THIS COURT'S REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION DECISION IS PLENARY IN THIS 
CASE. 
In its response to the plaintiff's appeal, the defendant 
states that, in order to reverse the Industrial Commission's deci-
sion in this case, this court must find that decision to be 
"wholly without cause." This misstates the standard of review 
applicable to this appeal. 
The industrial commission found that the plaintiff's 
injury occurred during the normal course of her on-the-job duties. 
The plaintiff does not take issue with this finding of fact. 
Rather, the plaintiff challenges the interpretation of the work-
man's compensation law specifically Section 35-1-45, Utah Code 
Annotated. The Industrial Commission ruled that an injury 
occurring in the normal course of one's work task cannot be an 
accident for the purposes of the workmen's compensation law. The 
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plaintiff urges this court to reject this view of the law and 
substitute in its stead a rule which holds that an injury may 
qualify as an accident if it occurrs during the normal course of 
one's work duties, so long as the injury itself is unexpected and 
unintentional and so long as a causal connection exists between 
the injury and the work task. Because this appeal involves solely 
a question of law, this court must exercise de novo review of the 
Industrial Commission's decision. Antillon v. Department of 
Employment Security, 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984). 
POINT II THE HOLDING IN SABO REQUIRES CLARIFICATION 
The defendant also argues that this case is directly 
controlled by Sabo's Electric Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982). The defendant states that Sabo stands for the proposition 
that an injury occurring during the normal course of one's work is 
not an accident for the purposes of the workman's compensation 
law. However, the plaintiff believes that Sabo does not stand for 
this rule at all and that the court should at this time clarify 
the Sabo holding. 
In order to understand and resolve the issue involved 
here, it is necessary to look first to Section 35-1-45 of the 
workmen's compensation statute. That section states, in pertinent 
part: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment . . . shall be paid compensation. 
U.C.A. § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1985). 
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From its terms, this section states a two part test for deter-
mining whether a compensable accident has occurred. The first 
part of the test calls for a finding of an "accident." The second 
part requires that the "accident", arise out of or in the course 
of employment. Note that under the statute, an "accident" is not 
the same thing as a "compensable accident." Rather, "accident" is 
one element of a "compensable accident." 
The confusion in this case then, stems from the following 
passage contained in Sabo. 
Accident has been broadly defined as "an unan-
ticipated, unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events." The accident must 
result in an injury which is causally related 
to the work being done. 
Id. at 725. (Quoting Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 
260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965)). The defendant, and apparently the 
Industrial Commission, interpret this passage to mean that inter-
jected into the definition of the word "accident" is a causal ele-
ment which requires that injuries occurring during "usual and 
normal [work] activities" must be denied coverage on the ground 
that such injuries as a matter of law were fortuitous, or in other 
words, could not have been caused by work. 
However, the plaintiff believes that the quoted passage 
really states the two part test for compensable accident set forth 
in Section 35-1-45 of the workmen's compensation statute. The 
first sentence of the passage from Sabo states the test for deter-
- 4 -
mining whether an "accident" has occurred. As that sentence sta-
tes , the test for "accident has been broadly defined" [Emphasis 
added] and covers any "unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur . . . " ][d. This test weeds 
out intentional, self-inflicted injuries. The second sentence of 
the passage states the second part of the test. That is, for an 
accident to qualify as a "compensable accident", it must be 
causally related to the work done. In other words, accident plus 
causation equals "compensible accident." 
The plaintiff believes its interpretation of Sabo is the 
proper one. The defendant's reading of the case results in a two 
part test in which both parts require a finding of causation. 
This interpretation results in a test for compensable accident 
contrary to the plain meaning of the workmen's compensation sta-
tute. The proper interpretation is that there first be a deter-
mination of accident, independent of the issue of causation and 
that then, a factual determination be made on the issue of causa-
tion. As a consequence, while it may be relevant in deciding 
whether the causation test is met and a "compensable accident" has 
occurred, the fact that an injury occurs in the normal course of 
"usual and normal activities" should never be an issue in deciding 
(as the industrial commission did in this case) the threshold 
question of whether the injury qualifies as an "accident." 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this 
court reverse the Industrial Commissions decision on the grounds 
that any unintentional, unexpected injury that occurs in the 
course of one's employment qualifies as an "accident", and that 
the plaintiff's case be remanded to the Industrial Commission for 
further determination concerning causation for the purpose of 
determining whether the plaintiff's injury qualifies as a compen-
sable accident. 
DATED this ^ 6/Aday of J ^ — , 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
DentoryM^/l ia tch 
W e s l ^ M ^ Lang 
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